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The Great War of 1914-1918 transformed the relationship of the United States to 
Europe, creating a raft of new opportunities for commerce, diplomacy, and pub-
lic understanding. Among the public figures to find these possibilities inspiring 
was Walter S. Rogers, a liberal journalist dedicated to the cause of improving the 
quality of foreign reporting. Rogers was best known to the public in 1918 as the 
director of a New York City-based international news service that he operated for 
the Committee on Public Information, the government's official news agency. 
Rogers fervently believed that the foreign press was systematically distorting 
US news by foregrounding sensationalistic atrocity stories and underreporting 
uplifting accounts of current events. To set the record straight, Rogers oversaw 
an ambitious government project to feed foreign journalists carefully curated 
news reports that they could then run in their own publications. 1 
Rogers's wartime experience led him to promote a journalism-centric liberal 
internationalism. Liberal internationalism was not new in 1918. Yet it received a 
boost from US President Woodrow's Wilson eloquent paeans to freedom and de-
mocracy, as well as the high hopes with which many invested the diplomatic ne-
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gotiations in Paris that followed the cessation of hostilities in western Europe ir 
November 1918. 2 In Rogers's view, liberal internationalism presupposed the es-
tablishment of an international organization dedicated to providing journalists 
with cheap and abundant information on current events. Toward this end, Rog-
ers hoped to combine in a single organization the regulation of the world's cable 
and radio networks, two networks that had previously been regulated under sep-
arate international conventions. This new organization, in turn, would supersede 
the International Telegraph Union, a membership-based federation of govern-
ment-appointed technical experts, based in Berne, Switzerland, that had long co-
ordinated the regulation of international communications. 
In Roger's opinion, radio networks should not, like cable networks, be li-
censed to private corporations. 3 On the contrary, he hoped that radio networks 
-which, at this time, were mostly point-to-point-would be administered directly 
by the governments of the nations in which they were based, and configured to 
support print-based news media. The news outlets that Rogers had in mind were 
primarily metropolitan newspapers, which Rogers assumed would remain the 
principal medium for the circulation of information on current events. For Rog-
ers, liberal internationalism encouraged the emergence of a thriving, uncen-
sored, metropolitan press untainted by propaganda, an institution that in his 
view had flourished in the United States, but none of the other Great Powers, 
during the Great War. 
In the short run, Rogers's project flopped. His proposal for the unification of 
cable and radio regulation failed to overcome the objections of its critics, and 
radio broadcasting in the United States emerged as an advertising driven broad-
cast medium, an outcome Rogers deplored. In the long run, however, Rogers's 
commitment to expanding facilities for the circulation of information would 
find expression in the innovative frequency allocation protocols that emerged 
out of the 1927 Washington, DC-based International Radiotelegraph Conference. 
Prior to 1927, the allocation of frequencies in the electromagnetic spectrum had 
been based on political jurisdiction, a convention that empowered national gov-
ernments to determine how their portion of the spectrum would be used. Follow-
2 Manela, The Wilsonian Moment. 
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ing the conference, wavelengths would be allocated by the service they provided, 
rather than the jurisdiction to which they had been assigned. Jurisdiction-specif-
ic, location-based allocations favored government network providers, such as 
the Postal, Telegraph, and Telephone ministries in Europe and Japan. Service-
specific, application-based allocations, in contrast, encouraged technically ad-
vanced network providers, which included, in the United States, corporations, 
to obtain exclusive access to specific wavelengths. Ironically, given Rogers's pref-
erence for government owned radio stations, the restructuring of the electromag-
netic spectrum to favor service over location helped to entrench the very techno-
cratic corporatism that Rogers opposed. 4 
Rogers justified his liberal internationalism in a rhetorically expansive, 
multi-page memorandum that he prepared at the request of US President Wood-
row Wilson in February 1919, four months after the Armistice, and twenty-one 
months before the first regularly scheduled US-based radio broadcast. Rogers 
was based at this time in Paris, where he was coordinating news coverage of 
the US delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, a logical follow-up to the 
work he has performed in New York City during the war for the Committee on 
Public Information. "Barriers to the flow of news from nation to nation," Rogers 
declared in his preamble, should be "removed in the general public interest": 
"The ideal is a world-wide freedom for news, with important news going every-
where." Under existing conditions, Rogers concluded, the unimpeded global 
flow of information had become an indispensable prerequisite for world 
peace: "The steady extension of democratic forms of government and the in-
creasing closeness of contact between all parts of the world point to the con-
clusion, that the ultimate basis of world peace is common knowledge and under-
standing between the masses of the world. Hence the distribution of intelligence 
in the form of news becomes of the utmost importance." 5 To hasten the free flow 
of information across national borders, Rogers looked to the League of Nations, 
which, or so he hoped, would become a center for the exchange of technical in-
formation regarding radio that would work closely with whatever protocols tech-
nical experts might see fit to devise. 6 
Rogers's expansive conception of the possibilities of the press would inform 
the position that he took as a delegate to an international communications con-
ference that the victorious powers convened in Washington, DC, in October 1920. 
Attendance at this conference was limited to five countries: the United Kingdom, 
4 Schwoch, The American Radio Industries, chapter 3. 
S Rogers, "Memorandum on Wire and Radio Communications," 429, 441. 
6 Ibid., 441. 
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France, the United States, Italy, and Japan. Its original rationale was to resolve a 
number of issues left over from the Paris Peace Conference. Of these the mast 
pressing was the legal status of German cables that the allies had cut, and in 
some instances, repurposed, during the war. Yet the conference soon acquire(! 
the much more open-ended rationale of drafting the charter for an entirely 
new international organization-a Universal Electrical Communications Union 
-that would create for the first time in world history a single forum for the reg. 
ulation of every form of electrically mediated communications-telegraphy, tel-
ephony, cable, and radio. No longer would cable and radio be regulated under 
different international conventions, as they had been in the past. 7 
The failure of the 1920 Washington conference reveals some of the limita-
tions of liberal internationalism. These constraints become especially evident 
if one views the conference through Rogers's eyes, which it is possible to do, 
given the existence in the National Archives of several boxes of Rogers's official 
files.8 Little used by historians, these papers provide a window on the challenges 
7 "Comite radiotelegraphique international," Journal Telegraphique, September 1921, 17~ 
"Apres la conference de Landres," Journal Telegraphique, July 25, 1922, 124. 
8 Rogers is a neglected figure. Though he sometimes gets a walk-on role in historical accounts of
US communications during the war years and its immediate aftermath, the specific nature of his 
contribution is typical overlooked. For one exception, see Winseck and Pike, Communications 
and Empire, 13, 262-74. Winseck and Pike credit Rogers with inventing in the 1910s more-or· 
less out of whole cloth the "free flow of information doctrine" that would become "bedrock prin· 
ciples of US international communications policy after the Second World War" (13). This claim 
overstates the novelty of Roger's faith in the democratic potential of information, which was 
shared by generations of journalists, public figures, and educators, and can be traced back at 
least as far as the Enlightenment. In addition, it obscures the kind of information that Rogers 
hoped would circulate freely. Rogers had no interest in facilitating the flow of information 
tout court; rather, he hoped to improve the facilities for information-gathering and informa-
tion-dissemination for newspaper journalists specializing in world affairs. Winseck and Pike 
based their argument in part on the remarkable paean to Rogers that was penned in 1943 by Co-
lumbia Journalism School dean, Carl W. Ackerman, in his annual dean's report. In this report, 
Ackerman hailed Rogers as the "leading authority in the United States today on international 
communications in relation to the flow of news" and the "originator of the idea of international 
press freedom both ideologically and practically." To drive this point home, Ackerman reprinted 
as "source documents" copious extracts from Rogers's postwar writings on international com· 
munications, including Rogers's 1919 memorandum to Wilson, which Ackerman erroneously 
claimed to have never before been published. Ackerman's admiration for Rogers was informed 
by Ackerman's personal experience as a journalist who had worked closely with the US govem· 
ment during the First World War, a circumstance that highlights an often overlooked continuity 
in twentieth-century US information policy: Long before the Cold War, government officials and 
journalists had collaborated to broadcast flattering news about the United States to the world, 
Report of the Dean of the Graduate School of Journalism for the Academic Year Ending June 30, 
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that confronted US public figures like Rogers who had hoped in the aftermath of 
the Great War to expand the role of the United States in world affairs. 9 
3.1 The Rationale for a Universal Electrical 
Communications Union 
The decision to hold the 1920 conference in Washington, DC, posed for its organ-
izers a number of challenges. Among them was the fact that the US government 
was not a signatory to the International Telegraph Convention, and therefore not 
a member of the International Telegraph Union. This was true, even though US 
network providers had participated in var.ious Telegraph Union-sponsored meet-
ings for many decades. In the case of radio, the situation was quite different. The 
discovery around 1900 that radio could facilitate ship-to-shore communications 
prompted the US government to send delegates to the Preliminary Conference on 
wireless telegraphy in Berlin in 1903. Though the US Congress would not ratify 
an international radiotelegraph convention until 1912, the US Navy had moni-
tored international radio regulation since 1903 and would keep close watch on 
the deliberations in Washington in 1920. 10 
Rogers was well aware of the anomalous position of the United States in the 
realm of international communications, and worked diligently to make the pro-
posed new organization palatable to the principal US stakeholders, and, in par-
ticular, to government officials, journalists, and merchants engaged in interna-
tional trade. 
By far the most prominent government official in Rogers's camp was Presi-
dent Wilson. Rogers had earned high praise from Wilson administration insiders 
for the wartime news bureau that Rogers had operated for the Committee on 
Public Information, leading Wilson to hail him as the "best posted man we 
have" on the complicated questions arising out of the disposition of the German 
cables seized by the allies during the war. 11 
Rogers shared Wilson's visceral dislike of big business and was broadly sym-
pathetic to the determination of Wilson's postmaster general Albert S. Burleson 
1943 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1943): 8; Menard McCune and Hamilton, "My object 
is to be of service to you." 
9 Rogers's files can be found in RG 43, National Archives, Suitland, Maryland (hereafter NA). 
10 Douglas, Inventing American Broadcasting, chapter 3. 
11 Woodrow Wilson interview, 27 September 1920, in Papers of Woodrow Wilson, edited by Ar-
thur S. Link (Princeton: Princeton UnJversity Press, 1966- 1994), vol. 66, 154; AJtken, The Contin-
uous Wave, 262 - 79. 
60 - Richard R. John 
to lower international cable rates and retain radio under tight government con. 
trol. All three men were democratic statists skeptical of corporate control of com. 
munications networks and sympathetic to their regulation and even outright 
ownership by the government. Rogers could rhapsodize about the "illimitable 
possibilities" of this new medium: there was no "technical reason," he mused , 
why at some point in not-too-distant future a radio message could not be inter. 
cepted in "every house in the world." 12 Yet the future of the new medium re-
mained in 1919 an open question, and filled Rogers and his fellow democratic 
statists with foreboding. 
The radio network that Rogers envisioned in 1919 remained a point-to-point 
medium, rather than the broadcast medium it would soon become. This funda-
mental assumption, which was rooted in Rogers's background in and commit-
ment to journalism-and in particular to the voracious demand of newspaper 
publishers for cheap, timely, and abundant information-shaped not only his ap-
proach to the Washington conference but also his later career as a director of the 
Institute of Current World Affairs, a philanthropic organization based frrst in 
New York City, and today in Washington, DC, that since the 1920s has provided 
journalists with fellowships to broaden their horizons by traveling abroad.13 
Rogers's proposals regarding international communications built on his con-
viction that both cable and radio should be configured to facilitate the work of 
newspaper publishers. Advantageous rates for the transmission of time-sensitive 
news dispatches were key and Rogers presumed that these could only be assured 
if an international organization, such as the proposed Universal Electrical Com· 
munications Union, had the authority to fix cable and radio rates and mandate 
preferential access for journalists' time-sensitive dispatches. Each nation, in Rog-
ers' view, should "nationalize" its radio facilities, since private enterprise would 
never expand rapidly enough to meet the anticipated demand. A "laissez-faire 
policy," Rogers predicted, might well lead to "slow progress, confusion, and a 
monopolistic control, with self-interest rather than the general good of humanity 
furnishing the directive motive. "14 
To realize the potential of the new medium would exceed the capabilities of 
even the largest and most ambitious of the world's corporations: "The working 
out of such a comprehensive system of radio communication, the making of 
schedules, the standardization of practice, and so forth, goes beyond the possi· 
bilities of private enterprise or of the interest of any one nation. "15 Should the 
12 Rogers, .. Memorandum," 430 - 31. 
13 "Walter S. Rogers," Washington Post, November 1,1965; Hapgood, Charles R. Crane, 91- 92 
14 Rogers, .. Memorandum," 431. 
15 Ibid., 431- 32 
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world's statesmen permit this situation to persist, global commerce would be sti-
fled, the press would remain unnecessarily "provincial," and the "propagandist" 
would thrive: "If statesmanship bas the vision and the organizing ability, the 
most widely separated communities can be made neighbors, trading with each 
other, interested in each other, understanding each other, learning from each 
other."16 
The regulation of the world's cable network presented a different kind of 
challenge. Like most informed observers, Rogers took it for granted that this net-
work, which for many years had been operated by a tight cartel of multinational 
corporations, had been and would remain closely allied with the British govern-
ment, a circumstance that he viewed with alarm. Rogers did not, however, rec-
ommend that cable corporations be "internationalized" and put under the juris-
diction of the League of Nations, a suggestion, he conceded, that "had been 
made. "17 Rather, he hoped they might be run like other "public utilities" -such 
as, for example, telephone exchanges, gas works, and electric power stations 
that, or so he assumed, had traded low volume and high rates for high volume 
and low rates. In such a world, Rogers mused, cable rates would be set so low 
that, in the lucrative North Atlantic market, letter-writing would become obso-
lete.18 
The primary exception was the Pacific, where Rogers knew on the basis of 
personal experience that the nation-based public utility model could never suc-
ceed. Here, and only here, he proposed the internationalization of the cable net-
work by encouraging intergovernmental cooperation between the United King-
dom, the United States, Japan, and China to provide "ample facilities at low 
rates."19 
To allay popular suspicion toward the new international organization, Rog-
ers downplayed its novelty. The United States had long played a prominent role 
in international organizations to facilitate the circulation of information, Rogers 
reminded lawmakers in October 1919. A case in point was the Universal Postal 
16 Ibid., 442. Rogers's journalistic boosterism won the admiration of public figures across party 
lines. For example, though Wilson's successor, Warren G. Harding was a Republican rather than 
a Democrat, Harding had been a small-town newspaper editor- which prompted him quite un-
derstandably to hail approvingly the low cable tolls that Rogers predicted his proposed Uni-
versal Electrical Communications Union would bring. "A Universal Communications Union," 
Washington Herald, November 19, 1920; "Harding Discusses Cable Tolls with Washington Corre-
spondents," Editor and Publisher 53 (December 11, 1920). 
17 Rogers, "Memorandum," 433. 
18 Ibid., 434- 35. 
19 Ibid., 440. 
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Union, to which the United States had belonged since its founding in 1874, and 
for which US postmaster general Montgomery Blair had helped lay the ground. 
work in the 1860s during the administration of Abraham Lincoln. 20 
The decision to incorporate the familiar words "Universal" and "Union" into 
the name of the new organization originated in Washington, DC. Neither of these 
two words can be found in the early printed draft of the convention in Rogers's 
files in which the new organization is referred to merely as a "Combined Tele-
graph and Radio Convention. "21 By the time the Washington conference finished 
its deliberations, however, it had been officially branded the Universal Electrical 
Communications Union- a conciliatory gesture, very possibly of Rogers's own 
devising, that linked it with an organization in which the United States had 
long belonged. 
The authorship of this early draft of the convention remains something of a 
mystery. In all probability, given its high level of technical detail, it had been pre-
pared by an administrator in the British Post Office, presumably under the super-
vision of W. J. Brown, the British civil servant mostly closely linked with the 1920 
conference. 22 If Brown or someone in his office had indeed taken the lead in pre-
paring this draft, it should come as no surprise that the word "universal" was 
nowhere to be found, since, in this period, British civil servants tended to asso-
ciate "universal" with the British Empire, rather than the world. 23 
When lawmakers asked Rogers who had originally proposed that the confer-
ence be held in Washington, he replied he did not know. 24 Almost certainly this 
was a feint. 25 Had Rogers acknowledged that the project had substantial British 
20 Rogers, Testimony, October 10, 1919, International Conference, 12. The original idea for the 
convening of a conference to give a "general direction of the whole communication field," Rog-
ers added, "was based on the International Postal Union" (12). 
21 "Draft of Combined Radio and Telegraph Convention," Correspondence of the Secretariat, 
dossier 300 - 341, RG 43, NA. 
22 "Digest of Minutes of First Plenary Meeting Preliminary Session of the International Confer· 
ence on Electrical Communications," October 8, 1920, RG 43, NA; Schwoch, American Radio In· 
dustries, 64 - 65. 
23 John, "The Public Image of the Universal Postal Union in the Anglophone World." 
24 Rogers, Testimony, International Conference, 12, 17. 
25 The British provenance of the proposed amalgamation of the cable and radio conventions 
was an article of faith at the Radio Corporation of America, the largest US manufacturer of 
radio equipment. To drive this point home, a Radio Corporation of America publicist published 
a pamphlet in May 1921 that branded the proposed Universal Electrical Communication Union a 
British trick to perpetuate British hegemony in global communications by protecting the inter· 
ests of British cable network providers: "The proposal to amalgamate the radio convention 
with the old wire convention based upon European practice came, as we understand, from 
the British. They are the only ones who have expressed formal approval of that principle. It is 
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support, this might well have sealed its fate, given the widespread popular dis-
trust of the influence that the British government had long exerted in the inter-
national cable business, and the looming fear that the British-based Marconi 
Company might dominate the still nascent radio business. 
The postal-electrical analogy intrigued not only Rogers, but also President 
Wilson. In December 1919, for example, Wilson informed the secretary of state 
-in a letter drafted by Wilson's wife Edith Galt Wilson, who was filling in for 
the ailing president, who had been felled by a stroke-that the Post Office De-
partment, and not the State Department, should head up the US delegation to 
the communications conference. 26 It is, thus, perhaps not surprising that, at 
the top of the first page of the draft convention in Roger's files, someone pen-
ciled in the phrase "Universal Communications Union," or that the margins of 
the draft include several inserts, both handwritten and typed, comparing the reg-
ulations of the new organization with those adopted by the Universal Postal 
Union.27 
ff the allusions to the Universal Postal Union reassured critics, any reference 
to the League of Nations raised red flags. This was especially true following the 
rejection by the US Senate of US membership in League in November 1919. It is 
obviously to their interest: they control cable communications throughout the world and natu-
rally desire to bring radio under the same control" (italics in original). Why, the company pub-
licist elaborated, had the organizers of the 1920 Washington conference ignored the US-govern-
ment-approved EU-F-GB-1 protocol of 25 August 1919? To pose the question was to answer it. The 
EU-F-GB-1 protocol was a narrowly technical document, drafted in consultation with the corpo-
ration-friendly US Commerce Department, that had sidestepped the sensitive diplomatic issue of 
corporate control, making it unsuitable for the techno-diplomatic coup that Rogers and his Brit-
ish colleagues had tried to orchestrate: "The EU-F-GB-1 Commission, as well as the Department 
of Commerce Committee, attempted to deal with only the technical aspects of the situation and 
not with diplomatic questions nor with those involving general policies." The exclusion of cor-
porate delegates from the 1920 Washington conference established a pattern- much resented by 
US corporate leaders-that carried over to the post-Commodore Hotel June-August 1921 Paris 
meeting of the technical committee on international radiocommunicatlon. Despite the protesta-
tions of US corporate leaders, the US delegation to this meeting, which had been convened ex-
plkitly to refine the regulations devised in the 1920 Washington conference, did not include a 
single corporate representative. Memorandum of Radio Corporation of America with Reference 
to the Proposed Universal Communications Union (n. p. 1921), 14, 18, box 3, dossier 5- 30, 
entry 66, RG 43, NA; Comite Technique de Radiocommunications Intemationales (Paris: lmprim-
erle Nationale, 1921): 47, ITU Library & Archives, Switzerland; Tomlinson, The International Con-
trol of Radiotelecommunications, 49. 
26 Edith Bolling Galt Wilson to Robert Lansing, December 24, 1919, in Papers of Woodrow Wil-
son. vol. 64, 228. 
27 "Draft of Combined Radio and Telegraph Convention," RG 43, NA. 
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thus not surprising that, though the early draft of the proposed convention . 
Rogers's files presumed that the organization would come under the jurisdictio 
of the League, in the final draft, all references to the League had been drop Ile( 
The new organization was, instead, to be a freestanding council under the illri! 
diction of representatives from the United States, France, the United Kingdon 
Italy, and Japan, and "four other representatives, chosen by the other signator 
parties, to be selected at each General Conference of High Contracting Parties."1 
The prospect that the United States might join an international communica 
tions organization had a solid base of support among US merchants engaged u 
foreign trade. Though the Washington conference was closed to the press, and i~ 
proceedings secret, it attracted the attention of several of the country's most in-
fluential business groups, who signed a joint statement endorsing its objectives 
shortly before it convened. The venue at which the signatories met was revealing, 
It took place not in Washington, DC, which remained a commercial backwat~ 
but in New York Oty at India House, a men's club for merchants interested in 
international commerce. Among the signatories were the US Chamber of Com-
merce, the New York Chamber of Commerce, the Merchants Association f 
New York, the American Bankers Association, the American Manufacturers Ex-
port Association, and the National Association of Manufacturers. In their joint 
statement, the signatories expressed their support for the establishment an "In· 
temational Telegraphic Communications Union"-modeled, they took care to 
specify, on the Universal Postal Union-that would facilitate the standardization 
of cable rates, ensure "free and unrestricted competition" among network pro· 
viders, and guarantee that every radio broadcast station was owned by a US citi· 
zen.29 
The journalists' wish list was even more specific. In an October 1920 meeting 
of the American Newspaper Publishers Association that was convened at the 
headquarters of the New York World in response to a request by Postmaster Gen· 
eral Burleson and Undersecretary of State Norman Davies, the publishers lob· 
hied for low and uniform rates for the transmission of news dispatches by
cable and wireless, preferential high-speed access to both the cable and wirelss 
networks, the abolition of monopoly grants for cable providers, the continuation 
of wireless transmission by the navy, and the establishment of an informational 
28 Universal E ectrical Communications Union: Revised Draft of Convention and Regulations (n. 
p., 1922), article 17, 3. 
29 "Recommendations of the India House Conference," entry 72, RG 43, NA. 
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clearinghouse in a major city on every continent to keep journalists abreast of 
the relevant technical issues. 30 
3.2 Corporate Opposition to the Universal 
Electrical Communications Union 
The enthusiasm of journalists, government officials, and merchants active in for-
eign trade for the establishment of a new international organization to regulate 
cable and radio would be challenged, and in the end overbalanced, by the hos-
tility toward the new organization of the managers of telegraph, telephone, 
cable, and radio corporations. To understand why these network providers 
found this new organization so threatening, it is useful to know something 
about international communications regulation in the decades preceding the 
Washington conference. 
The regulation of international communications in the 1920s was predicated 
on the venerable premise that communications networks that crossed political 
boundaries were best coordinated by international organizations whose voting 
members represented the territorially bounded jurisdictions that these networks 
linked. Corporations such as US telegraph giant Western Union could and did 
send delegates to international conferences, yet these delegates did not have vot-
ing rights and were not formal members of the International Telegraph Union, an 
anomaly that corporate leaders repeatedly invoked in defending their opposition 
to any new international organization that would perpetuate their marginaliza-
tion. Spatially based norms shaped the deliberations of the International Tele-
graph Union, the Universal Postal Union, and the International Radiotelegraph 
Union. Each of these organizations derived their authority from a formal, trea-
ty-like agreement that had been endorsed by representatives of the territorially 
bounded jurisdictions that had called them into being. It was in part for this rea-
son that these organizations were all called "unions." 
The International Telegraph Union and the International Radiotelegraph 
Union regulated international communications through conventions that their 
members had ratified. These conventions were by 1920 quite elaborate, and in-
cluded a raft of arcane protocols devised by technical experts. The resulting pro-
tocols were inter-national, in the sense that they had been designed to accommo-
date the interests of member nations. One such team had drafted the first version 
30 "Memorandum of Cable-Using Newspapers and Press Associations of America/' entry 75, 
box 3, RG 43, NA. 
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of the proposed convention that Rogers and his colleagues debated in WashJn 
ton in the Fall of 1920. The art of crafting such protocols can be called "techni 
0, 
diplomacy." 
The hostility of US network providers toward the proposed new organizau 
was catalyzed by their discovery that a small group of US government experts~ 
who, of course, included Rogers-had been cooperating with their British coun. 
terparts to establish a new international organization to regulate every electrtCaJ 
communications medium: telegraphy, telephony, cable, and radio. The assertion 
that the proposed organization had been modeled on the Universal Postal Union 
-a circumstance that Rogers had hoped would make it seem less exotic-wasfor 
corporate network providers no comfort at all. This was because the Postal Union 
worked exclusively with governments-prompting corporate leaders, not alto-
gether implausibly, to demonize the new organization as the first step in a seer~ 
campaign to nationalize the entire electrical communications sector. 
The realization that the new organization's backers included Albert S. Burle-
son did little to allay these concerns. Burleson, after all, was an outspoken dem-
ocratic statist who, as postmaster general, had vocally backed a government 
takeover of telegraphy, telephony, and cable, and who, under the cover of mill· 
tary exigency, would briefly operate all three networks under government con•
trol. Should the United States join the new international organization, orso 
warned the presidents of Western Union and Commercial Cable on the eve of 
the 1920 Washington conference, this would inevitably increase the likelihood 
that their corporations might find themselves subject to onerous regulations i · 
tended to further the interests of their government-owned and govemment-oper· 
ated rivals. 31 
The hostility of corporate network providers toward the new organization 
boiled over in an extraordinarily contentious two-day private meeting between 
Rogers and several of the country's most important communications executives 
that took place at the Commodore Hotel in New York City in May 1921. The frank 
and often heated q.iscussions that took place during this meeting, which, fortu· 
nately for the historian, were professionally transcribed, threw into sharp relief 
the ideological gulf that separated Rogers's anti-corporate democratic statism 
-a holdover from the now-out-of-power Wilson administration-from the in· 
creasingly self-confident technocratic corporatism of the country's business 
elite. American Telephone & Telegraph executive John J. Carty complained bitter· 
ly about the exclusion of corporate-based technical experts from the 1920 Wash· 
ington meeting, while RCA counsel Charles Naeve reminded his colleagues thal 
31 "US May Partner in Wire Agreement," Washington, DC, Evening Star, September 29, 1920. 
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Rogers favored the nationalization of radio broadcasting, an outcome that had 
had considerable support in the Wilson administration, but that corporate lead-
ers vehemently opposed. The proposed treaty, Naeve protested, was "patterned 
entirely after the League of Nations, which subordinates national interests to 
the views of internationalism, which do not seem to be very popular." Will the 
US government support "any treaty which is based on Government ownership, 
as this seems to be"? 32 Neither Carty nor Naeve regarded the techno-diplomacy 
of the Washington conference to be neutral and benign: if ostensibly apolitical 
experts were to define the rules of the game, they wanted their experts to be 
in the room. 
Historians today who anachronistically read the history of the interwar peri-
od backward from the post-1989 neoliberal order, rather than forward from the 
Great Power rivalries of the fin de siecle, sometimes discount the importance 
of geopolitics in the public debates over global communications during the 
1920s. US corporate leaders knew better. No one who attended the Commodore 
Hotel meeting-or who carefully reads the transcript of the discussions that oc-
curred-could possibly overlook the central role that contemporaries ascribed to 
the struggle for control in global communications between the United Kingdom 
and the United States, or, for that matter, glibly assume that cable, wireless, or 
corporations lacked a national identity. 
Corporate ownership of electrical network providers did not, it should be un-
derscored, preclude all forms of government intervention. A case in point was 
the thorny question of government ownership. The managers of every US tele-
graph and cable corporation well understood that Congress had the right to pur-
chase their assets at a mutually agreed upon valuation. For telegraph network 
providers, this right could be traced back to their acceptance of the National 
Telegraph Act of 1866; for cable network providers, to the various landing rights 
agreements into which they had entered. 33 The crux of the issue, that is, was not 
some absolute right to private property. Even so, network providers remained ap-
prehensive about the consequences for their bottom line should the US govern-
ment join an international communications organization dominated by nations 
in which every form of electrical communication was either owned or operated 
by the government or had come under tight government control. The Commercial 
Cable Company, explained its president, Clarence H. Mackay in 1921-in looking 
32 "Conference between the American Delegates to the International Conference on Electrical 
Communications and Various Representatives of American Telegraph, Cable, and Radio Compa-
nies ... " Commodore Hotel, New York, 26 May 1921, 299- 300, 301- 302, entry 72, RG 43, NAi 
Schwoch, American Radio Industries, 66- 69. 
33 John, Network Nation, 116- 23; Mackay, International Cable Communication, 11. 
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back on the Washington conference- had no objection to the US joining the Jn. 
ternational Telegraph Union if his corporation could be protected from "unrea-
sonable regulations, present and future" that would "not only destroy the enter-
prise of a competitive service but reduce the private companies to the conditions 
of government ownership. "34 
It was a time-honored American tradition, Mackay explained, in reiterating 
the principled antimonopolism that in the United States had long been a ubiq-
uitous feature of public discourse, to "encourage unrestricted commercial enter-
prise." In elaborating on this position, Mackay underscored that both the US gov-
ernment and the American people would "best be served" by "relying on the 
continuance of competitive enterprise," as opposed to, say, compelling the US 
cable corporations to comply with rules that had been devised more for the pur-
pose of "protecting European government telegraph systems" than for strength-
ening corporate network providers. 35 Here was one instance, of the several that 
could be cited, in which the time-honored US bias in favor of private enterprise, 
as opposed, that is, to government ownership, encouraged not only the regula-
tory uncoupling of international communications networks from national gov-
ernments, but also the operational separation of telegraphy, cable, and radio 
into different organizations, outcomes broadly congruent with the longstanding 
commitment of US lawmakers to antimonopoly as a civic ideal. 
3.3 The Legacy of the 1920 Washington 
Conference 
Writing in the first issue of Foreign Affairs in 1922, Rogers did his best to keep 
alive the rapidly receding idea that it would be beneficial for the country and 
the world if "electrical communications," by which he meant telegraphy, teleph· 
ony, cable, and radio were operated on the "same basis" as the mail. Was it "fan· 
tastic idealism" to hope that every means of communications might be operated 
as a public service to promote the public good, as opposed to the status quo, in 
which, in the United States, electrical communications remained a corporate pre-
rogative? Rogers thought not: "A postal service handling letters generally 
throughout the world for two or five cents is conceived on a radically different 
34 Mackay, International Cable Communication, 19, 20. 
35 Ibid., 20. 
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basis from one which fixes its charges by distance and by what the traffic will 
bear and avoids unprofitable activities."36 
Rogers's proposal prefigured the triumph of a government-dominated liberal 
internationalism in which public service supplanted private profit. This project 
would remain unrealized , Rogers recognized, so long as US participation in in-
ternational communications conferences remained constrained by the narrow, 
short-term profit-oriented worldview of US corporations. If the United States 
were to participate in future communications conferences "solely to further 
the immediate interests of American cable and radio companies," Rogers brood-
ed, he felt certain that its participation "would not be relished by those who en-
visage a worldwide network of communications operated on a public service 
basis."37 
Rogers's endorsement of a public service rationale for international commu-
nications fit well with, and had been largely shaped by, his journalistic experi-
ence. For Rogers, as for many of his fellow journalists, it was hard to distinguish 
the interests of the nation and the world from those of the press. Yet its appeal 
extended well beyond like-minded journalists, merchants, and government offi-
cials. In addition, it retained support among the many Americans who opposed 
private ownership of the electromagnetic spectrum, and helps explain why the 
1927 US Radio Act unequivocally declared the airwaves public property, a posi-
tion that would be endorsed later that year by the US delegation to the 1927 In-
ternational Radiotelegraph Conference, which met in Washington, DC.38 
The 1927 conference established the basic principles for the allocation of 
global electromagnetic spectrum that remains in force today. While this outcome 
was heralded by US radio broadcasters, it did nothing to allay their principled 
opposition to US membership in the International Telegraph Union. Not until 
1932 would this situation change, when, in a concession to US corporations, 
the International Telegraph Union relaxed its membership rules to pennit corpo-
rations a more active role in the formulation of technical standards. In the years 
to come, Rogers's anti-corporate liberal internationalism would recede in favor 
of a pro-corporate technocratic corporatism that was subtly concealed by the 
substitution in the organization 's official name of "telegraph" for "telecommuni-
cation," a French neologism that had been coined by a French postal adminis-
trator several decades earlier to refer exclusively to communications networks 
exclusively under government control. 39 Though the United States never joined 
36 Walter S. Rogers, "International Electrical Communications," 144- 45. 
37 Rogers, "International Electrical Communications," 157. 
38 Scbwoch, "The American Radio Industry." 
J, John. Network Nation, 12. 
' 
70 - Richard R. John 
the International Telegraph Union, it would become a founding member of the 
International Telecommunication Union, into which the Telegraph Union was 
folded in 1932. 
The refusal of the United States to join the International Telegraph Union 
had few negative repercussions for US telegraph and cable network providers. 
In the case of radio, the situation was quite different. The successful commerci-
alization in the 1900s of one-to-one wireless telegraphy by the British-based 
Marconi Corporation confronted US lawmakers with a formidable challenge. In 
the absence of some kind of international agreement, it seemed entirely possible 
that the US navy would find it impossible to communicate by wireless with its 
warships at sea without relying on Marconi equipment. It should, thus, not 
come as a surprise that the US government took part in the 1903 and 1906 Berlin 
radiotelegraph conferences-the world's first-or, for that matter, that it spon-
sored the 1927 conference that restructured the allocation of the electromagnetic 
spectrum. 
US insiders praised the 1927 conference for hastening, as Washington lawyer 
Harold S. LeRoy would later explain, the "more orderly regulation of rapidly 
growing world radio traffic. "40 Private ownership of the electromagnetic spec-
trum was rejected out of hand, a concession not only to European delegates, 
but also to US supporters of a broad concept of public utility-including Rog-
ers-who saw parallels between the regulation of the electromagnetic spectrum 
and the regulation of municipal franchise corporations. 41 
Support for government ownership of the electromagnetic spectrum extend· 
ed even to RCA president James G. Harbord. Every system of "electrical commu-
nication" in the United States-Harbord conceded, in an article for Foreign Af 
fairs that he published on the eve of the 1927 conference-was "of necessity a
species of public utility." In keeping with this premise, Harbord underscored 
that the "ether" above US territorial limits was the property of the US people 
and could ''only be used by license of the Secretary of Commerce." The owner· 
ship of radio broadcast stations, however, should, at least in the United States, 
remain private. This was because, Harbord elaborated, under US law the US gov-
40 Le Roy, "International Radiotelegraph Conference," 86 - 87. 
41 The relationship between municipal franchise legislation and public utility regulation is a 
neglected topic in US communications history. In large part, this is because of the reluctance 
of communications historians to recognize the continuing role in the 1920s of subnational juris· 
dictions in the formulation of radio regulations. Many of these regulations were shaped by the 
courts, which repeatedly found themselves adjudicating contests between rival radio broadcast· 
ers over the increasingly congested airwaves of the nation's largest large cities-including, in 
particular, New York and Chicago. 
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emment could not interfere with the "managerial or operations functions" of an 
"electrical communications company" so long as this corporation conducted its 
affairs in accordance with the "rule of law. "42 
Harbord's conclusion furnished a stark reminder of the anomalous position 
of US network providers in international communications. Most of the world's 
countries, Le Roy reflected, in summarizing the results of the 1927 conference, 
operated their communications networks as "Government monopolies." The 
US government, in contrast, did not. On the contrary, it made a critical distinc-
tion between ''government regulations" -with which US telegraph, telephone, 
cable, and radio corporations had no quarrel- and "management regulations," 
which they emphatically opposed- since the latter were "in conflict with the tra-
ditional policy of the United States for private operation of communications." 
The "strong position" of the US delegation on the "broad question of policy" 
with regard to government ownership, Le Roy elaborated, had two salutary ef-
fects. First, it "dampened the ardor" of European government administrators 
for the "intensive and stifling'' regulation of the new medium; and, second, it 
aroused in certain countries a "lively appreciation of the advantages of freedom 
from bureaucratic interference in the conduct of business activities which could 
be more efficiently handled under private control. "43 
The 1927 Washington conference would long occupy a special place in the 
imagination of US communications experts. The protocols that had been imple-
mented at this time, reflected State Department official Francis Colt De Wolf two 
decades later, would serve as a "guide for all international policing of the radio 
spectrum."44 De Wolf exaggerated: in Europe, the radio broadcasting spectrum 
had been allocated since 1925 by the International Broadcasting Union, a broad-
caster-led organization that operated in tandem with the International Radiotele-
graph Union. 
Even so, the protocols devised in 1927 would open the way for the first post-
Second World War international communications conference, which occurred in 
1947. Like the 1927 conference, this conference-which was, in fact, a series of 
network-specific conferences that met simultaneously-also convened in the 
United States, this time in Atlantic City, New Jersey, rather than Washington, DC. 
The Atlantic City conferences created the regulatory framework for a postwar 
technocratic corporatism in which the United States had finnly established itself 
as a dominant player on the world stage. ln the interwar period, the technocratic 
42 Harbord, "America's Position in Radio Communication,'' 470, 473. 
43 Le Roy, "International Radiotelegraph Conference," 86- 87. 
44 Colt De Wolf, "Telecommunications in the New World," 1282. 
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dream of a borderless world had stirred the imagination of certain corporate 
leaders and government administrators in United States and Europe. 45 Following 
the Second World War, this dream, long an article of faith for US corporate net-
work providers, would become a global norm. 46 
Among the defining features of this technocratic corporatism was its revival, 
albeit in a decidedly less journalistically centric guise, of Rogers's faith in the sa-
lutary potential of the unimpeded flow of information. "Statesmen must insist 
that intelligence may freely cross international boundaries," De Wolf explained, 
in surveying the results of the 1947 meeting: "Freedom of information must be a 
cornerstone of the new world, so that every man in every country will be free to 
choose what he wants to see and hear from what men in every other country 
offer to show and tell him. "47 
To be sure, limits existed: member countries retained the right to block the 
transmission of any telegraphic dispatch, radio broadcast, or telephone call that 
violated their laws or threatened their national interest. Yet the presumption that 
the free flow of inf onnation had become a universal norm was widely shared 
among political and corporate leaders in the United States and its allies, and 
would find expression in the following year in the 1948 United Nations-spon-
sored International Declaration of Human Rights. 48 
45 The technocratic vision of a borderless world did not necessarily challenge the power and 
authority of sovereign governments. Yet it did accord more autonomy to corporations than the 
liberal internationalism of the interwar era. In thinking about the relationship of technology, 
corporations, and governments, I have found useful Edgerton, "The Contradictions of Techno-
Nationalism and Techo-Globalism." Edgerton provides a salutary caution for those recent histor-
ians who recycle the "techno-globalist propaganda" of twentieth-century network providers. 
"For many of technologies invoked as being somehow essentially internationalizing," Egerton 
observes, "were profoundly national in origin and use. Radio, which had a military origin, 
was intimately connected to national power. The development of the radio before the Great 
War was intimately tied to navies- indeed the Royal Navy was the largest single customer of 
the Marconi Company, which led the world in radio. During and after the Great War, radio 
and the military remained closely tied; the Radio Corporation of America, for example, was 
closely tied to the US state" (13). 
46 The technocratic faith of US corporate leaders in a borderless world went back at least as the 
1910s, when it helped inspire the completion by Bell of a transcontinental telephone link. John, 
Network Nation, 389 - 93. 
47 De Wolf, "Telecommunications in the New World," 1290. 
48 Codding, "Jamming and the Protection of Frequency Assignments," 385. To contend that the 
International Telecommunication Union promoted technocratic corporatism in 1947 is not to 
contend that this regulatory regime lacked a political agenda. Indeed, in certain ways post-
1947 international communications regulations institutionalized a "virtual telephone cartel." 
On this point, see Cowhey, "The International Telecommunications Regime.,, Too often, Cowhey 
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1be post-Second World War ideaJiTeation of infonnation flows is sometimes 
bailed as a logical outcome of Rogers's liberal internationalism. In fact, to the 
extent that international communications regulations in this period ceased to 
prioritize the circulation of information on current events it had more in com-
mon with the technocratic corporatism Rogers despised than the liberal interna-
tionalism he had envisioned in his 1919 memorandum to President Wilson, and 
that he had tried unsuccessfully to institutionalize by lobbying in the following 
year for the establishment of the Universal Electrical Communications Union. 
3.4 Conclusion 
International communications regulation in the first half of the twentieth centu-
ry underwent a shift from a liberal internationalism overseen by sovereign gov-
ernments to a technocratic corporatism coordinated by ostensibly neutral norms. 
Technocratic corporatism was designed by and for a cosmopolitan elite whose 
allegiance to a specific territory-whether a city, region, or nation-could not 
be taken for granted. •9 In the years since 1947, the regulation of international 
communications would increasingly become the prerogative less of national gov-
ernments than of multinational and, increasingly, transnational corporations. 
These corporations, in turn, have come to be run by a small yet influential cos-
mopolitan elite that champions a conception of an international political econ-
omy that has come to be known as neoliberalism. 
Such a political economy presumed the emergence of a borderless world in 
which the circulation of information, people, and goods was regulated not by 
spatially bounded jurisdictions, which, by virtue of the fact that they were terri-
torially delimited, were responsive, at least, in principle, to their inhabitants, 
but, rather, by a cosmopolitan elite beholden to no authority other than a global 
market for goods and services that they largely controlled. 
Whether or not this twenty-first century variant on mid-twentieth-century 
technocratic corporatism can survive the myriad challenges that confront it, it 
is currently coming under increasing strain-buffeted by a resurgent nationalism 
resentful of cosmopolitan elites and dubious of open borders-reviving, perhaps, 
obseves, commentators on international communications have relied on the "cognitive frame. 
wens• of participants to justify their rationale, while the "history of telephone systems are clos-
er to myth than reality but nicely fit the political bargain underlying the regime" (182. 184). As a 
case in point. be emphasizes the "epistemic community" among telecommunications insiders 
that defended "national monopoly" (198). 
49 Schot and Lagenclijk, "Technocratic Internationalism in the Interwar YeaIS.• 
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the possibility in a new and different modality of the liberal intemationalislll 
that Rogers had championed in Washington in 1920 and that would help to de-
fine the possibilities and the limitations of the International Telegraph Union as
a global actor in the interwar era. 
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